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The Hong Kong construction market, particularly for the 
public-civil works, is very competitive. It is mainly because 
of the low entry barriers to the market. Under such a 
competitive bidding environment, the writer analyses the 
mechanism of how a contractor determines its optimum profit 
margin for a bid, and how the contractor's cost estimate 
affects its profitability. Furthermore, the writer analyzes 
the factors affecting the competi ti veness of the construction 
market, and proposes a preliminary framework to analyze the 
industry profitability. 
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Market Characteristics of the Construction Industry 
The market for construction industry has some unique 
characteristics when compared with other markets for 
traditional goods and services. 
Homogeneous Product without Market Price 
In manufacturing industries, the firms develop new 
products which are more or less heterogeneous in the markets. 
They can differentiate the products and set the price 
themselves to compete in the markets. In agriculture 
industries, however, the products are basically homogenious 
and the prices are determined by the market equilibrium of 
the demand and supply. 
In a construction industry, the products are si te-
specific projects, and no prevailing market prices exist. A 
bidding process becomes necessary to determine the price of 
each project. 
At the time of bidding, contractors bid for a project 
of which specifications are usually pre-determined. The 
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specifications are given by the client before the bidding in 
order to evaluate the bidding results on a similar basis. If 
the offered bids are not on similar basis, the client would 
have difficulty in assessing the lowest bid. 
This is particularly true for the ' Government's proj ects. 
In order to avoid the possibility of maneuvering the tender 
evaluation process, the Government ask all the bidders to 
submit a conforming bid, a bid conforming to the tender 
requirements. Alternative tenders are only considered if a 
bidder has submitted a conforming tender together with the 
alternative ones. Therefore contractors always need to submit 
a conforming tender. If only conforming tenders are 
submitted, the lowest tender is normally selected by the 
Government. Therefore, the contractors compete in the pricing 
for a homogeneous product without a market price. 
Contestable Market without Product Diversification 
Contractors compete in a contestable market without 
product diversification. Because a bid is for a homogeneous 
product at a time, contractors can not diversify the product. 
However, because there is no prevailing market price, 
contractors set the bidding price themselves, and can compete 
in the bidding price. Since the bidding price significantly 
affects the profi t and turnover of contractors, pricing 
strategy is more important than diversification strategy. 
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Pricing by Cost Estimate and Profit Margin 
In other industries, many firms can set the price of 
products after knowing the actual cost of production. 
However, because of site-specificity of construction, 
contractors never know the actual cost prior to the bidding. 
Furthermore, since construction projects continue for 
several years, estimation of the construction cost is 
inherently uncertain. Contractors are required to evaluate 
such uncertainty and incorporate it into the cost estimate. 
After the cost estimate is complete, they set a profit margin 
(mark up) based on their perceived elasticity of. the demand. 
Importance of Pricing Strategy 
Once a project is started, it is difficult to lower the 
total construction cost. It is because the bidder can not 
estimate all the cost perfectly at the time of bidding. 
Overlooked costs incur from time to time whereas estimated 
costs are usually realized. Hence actual construction cost 
tends to become more than its initial estimate, and thus 
lowering the total cost is quite difficult once the project 
is started. However, at the time of bidding, management may 
decide to increase the profit margin within a fraction of 
time. Therefore if a reasonable and practicable pricing model 
is developed to determine the profit margin, it would improve 
the profitability of the firm. 
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Overview of Hong Kong Construction Industry 
Hong Kong construction markets for both civil and 
building works are open to registered contractors. The 
Government maintains a list of approved contractors ,for its 
own proj ects. Domestic contractors are in List I, and further 
classified as Group A, Band C depending on the size of 
contractors. Overseas contractors are included in List 11. 
Basically domestic contractors in List I Group C and overseas 
contractors in List 11 are equivalent, and are competing 
against each other for huge infrastructure proj ects currently 
undertaken in Hong Kong such as for Airport Core Programmes 
projects. 
As -Hong Kong has been for decades one of the hottest 
regions in the world for infrastructure development, many 
reputed overseas contractors have entered the market. 
Although some have disappeared within a short period, many 
have survived in the market. One of the particular 
characteristics of the Hong Kong construction market is this 
ease of entry and exi t. , 
The Hong Kong Government register and include overseas 
contractors in their approved list if the overseas 
contractors have proven records of engineering and financial 
capabilities. Because of this Government policy, Hong Kong 
construction market is almost perfectly competitive, and 
becomes a contestable market. Because of diverse origins of 
contractors, contractors can not collude in the region, while 
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the collusion of contractors is a long debated problem in 
other countries such as Japan. 
This highly elastic nature of Hong Kong market makes it 
more important for the contractors in the region to formulate 
an effective pricing strategy for competitive bidding. 
Scope of the Project 
As diversification strategy is of limited use in the 
industry, an effective pricing strategy for competitive 
bidding is crucial to maximize profit and to survive ln the 
market. Pricing strategy has two maj or aspects. One is related 
to cost estimate, and the other is related to profit margin. 
Construction costs are related to numerous factors such 
as the cost of labors, plant and materials, efficiency of 
these three factors, inflation, engineering and financial 
capabili ties, management efficiency, and so on. Profi t margin 
is usually set by the top management as it significantly 
affects the total profit of the firm. 
Investigation of the attributes of actual costs is not 
within the scope of this project. Instead, the factors which 
affect the determination of profit margin are analyzed, and 
a model to formulate an effective bidding strategy is 
proposed. Such factors can be either static or dynamic. 
Previous bidding theories are evaluated by sample 
bidding data obtained from a contractor in Hong Kong. The 
bidding data consist of the Government's civil engineering 
projects during the last 11 years. However, since the cost 
6 
data are of confidential nature, raw cost data will not be 




Development of Bidding Theory 
Since 1956 after Lawrence Friedman published his paper 
in bidding theory, development of bidding theory has 
started. Decision analysis techniques were applied for 
traditional sealed bids, while game theories applied for 
auctions. The decision-analysis based theories aim to 
maximize the expected profit of a firm postulating that 
higher the bidding price is, less probability of winning is 
expected, and vice versa. It means that contractors lose a 
bid if the price is too high. However there would be no 
profit, even though they win the bid, if the price is too 
low. Hence there shall be an optimum bidding price which can 
maximize the expected profit. 
Friedman postulated this point in his research, and the 
later researches also follow this assumption. The main 
differences in later bidding theories are the methods to 
formulate the probability function of winning a bid in 
relation tQ the bidding price. Various models have been 
proposed to evaluate this relationship. 
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Friedman Model 
As described, the first systematic model was proposed 
by Lawrence Friedman in 1956. The formula postulates the 
relations among the expected profit, ~stimate cost, bidding 
price and probability of winning a bid as follows. 
E(x) = P(x) (x - e') 
Where, 
E(x) - expected profit 
c' - cost estimate 
x - bid price 
P(x) - probability of winning a bid 
Further h.e proposed to estimate the probability function 
as the product of the marginal probabilities of winning 
against each competitor. Using a concept of an "average" 
competitor, he formulated the probability function as 
follows. 
00 




f(r) - average bidder's bid cost ratio (the ratio of 
competitor's actual bid to the decision maker's 
cost estimate) 
k - independent average bidders 
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However, this model assumes that the probability of 
winning over each and every competitor is independent. This 
assumption actually ignores the joint probability and thus 
is not valid. For example, if three average contractors 
compete in a bid, each has a winning pr'obabili ty of one third 
but not one forth. 
Gates Model 
In 1967, Gates supplemented the Friedman model by 
proposing a more sophisticated probability function. However 
he was similar to Friedman in that he also used the probability 
of winning each and every contractor to estimate the 
probability of winning a bid. Gates proposed the probability 
of winning a bid as:-
1 
P(Bo<Bi, ....... ,Bo<Bn)= 1-Pi(Bo) 1-Pn(Bo) 
1+ + .... +----
Pi(Bo) Pn(Bo) 
Where, 
n - number of competitors 
Pi(Bo) - probability that the bid, Bo, is less than the 
bid of competitor i 
Later in 1970, he presented a simplified model for 
bidding against two competitors, A and B. The probability 
function were given as:-
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1 
P(x) == 1- peA) 1- P(B) 
1+ +---peA) P(B) 
This is the conditional probability of winning against 
both competi tors. The main difficul ty of applying both 
Friedman and Gates models to a real world situation is that 
the joint probability of winning over competitors is hardly 
obtained. 
Nevertheless, the number of bidders is an important 
factor which affects the probability of winning a bid. If "n" 
identical average bidders compete wi th each other, the 
winning probability of a contractor should be "l/n". Hence 
the essence of their approaches was to incorporate this 
number~of-bidders effect into the probability functions. 
Howard Model 
A diffe'rent approach appeared when Howard, in 1966, 
argued that only the lowest competitor's bid affects the own 
firm's success. Rather than considering the probability of 
winning over each competitor, he proposed to consider the 
probability of winning over the lowest competitor. 
r 
V = i 
l 
Where, 
Bo - C 
o 
V - expected profit 
Bo - bid mount 
if Bo < L 
otherwise 
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C - cost estimate 
L - lowest ' competitor's bid 
His formula is independent from each competitor's bid 
but only related to the lowest competitor's bid, which has 
eliminated the complexity in Friedman and Gates models. He 
postulated that the lowest competitor's bid is independent 
of "our" bid and that it is also independent of "our" cost 
estimate. He has modified the Friedman's profit formula by 
replacing the probability function of P(x) by P(L > Ba), the 
probability of submitting a bid lower than the lowest 
competitor's bid. 
E (V I Ba ,e) = P (L > Ba) (Ba - E [C le] ) (Ba - C) P (L > Ba) 
e - prior experience 
Kevin Model 
Later in 1977, Paul Kevin Serge further developed the 
Howard model that, as "our" cost is independent from the 
lowest competitor's bid, ,the ratio of the lowest competitor's 
bid, Ba, to "our" cost, C, is normally di s tr ibuted. Therefore 
the parameters of normal distribution, mean and standard 
deviation, can be estimated from sample data. The approach 
is to express expected profit as a function of probability 
density function of winning a bid, and thereafter 
differentiate the expected profit function to find out an 
optimum profi t margin which returns maximum expected profi t. 
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As suggested in early Friedman's model, probability of 
winning a bid is a function of profit, which is the difference 
between bid amount and cost estimate. Profi t is usually 
expressed by using a "profit margin", a ratio of profit portion 
to the cost estimate. Probability of winning decreases when 
profit margin increases as the number of successful bids 
decreases. However profit of a successful bid increases when 
the profit margin increases. Hence there could be an optimum 
profit margin which maximizes the expected profit. This 
bidding model is briefly formulated as follows. 
B = C + P 
PM = PlC = (B - C)/C = B/C - 1 
E(P) = Pw x P = Pw x C x PM 
Where, 
C - Cost estimate 
P - Estimated profit 
B - Bidding amount 
PM - Profit margin 
Pw - Probability of winning 
E(P) - Expected profit 
Therefore the optimum profit margin PM* which maximizes 




d{Pw x C x PM} 
= dPM =0 
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The variable "x" is a ratio of deviation of the lowest 
competitor's bid · price (B L ) to the cost estimate (C), or 
intuitively is a maximum profit margin "we" can set to win 
a bid when the lowest bid amount is "BL ". 
Where, 
x - maximum profit margin to win a bid 
BL - lowest competitor's bidding amount 
If the ratio of "our" cost estimate to the lowest bid 
amount is normally distributed, the variable "x" is also 
normally distributed, and the probability density function 





J.l - population mean of statistical variable "x" 
cr population standard deviation of statistical 
variable "x" 
If the variable "x" is equal to zero, the cumulative 
probability density function F(x) returns the probability 
that the variable (BL/C 1) lS less than zero. I f the 
variable (BL/C - 1) is less than zero, the ratio "BL/C" is less 
than one, and hence "we" can not win the bid as our cost 
estimate "CIf is greater than the lowest bid amount "BL". 
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Hence the returned value of F(O) is considered as the 
probability of losing a bid when the profit margin is zero. 
It is the probabili ty of being "BL < C". 
Similarly, the function F(x) returns a probability of 
losing a bid when the profit margin is x. While the function 
F(x) returns the probability that the variable (BL/C - 1) is 
less than x, it is a probability of loosing a bid at a profit 
margin of "x" since:-
Probability(BL/C - 1 < x) 
= Probability[BL < C(l + x)] 
= Probability(BL < B) 
Therefore the expected profit of a bid at a particular profit 
margin is given by:-
F(x) = Pl(x) Pw(x) = 1 - Pl(x) = 1 - F(x) 
E(P) x x C x Pw(x) = x x {I - F(x)} x C 
Where, 
x - profit margin 
Pl(x) - probability of losing a bid at a profit margin 
of x 
Pw(x) - probability of winning a bid at a profit margin 
of x 
Therefore the maximum expected profi t is gi ven when the 
profit margin satisfies the following differential equation. 
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dE(P) = {l-F(x)-xf(x)}xC 0 
dx 
1- F(x) - xf(x) = 0 
By solving this equation, the optimum profit margin, 
PM*, and the probability of winning at the optimum profit 
margin, Pw(PM*), can be obtained. 
x PM*, Pw(PM*) 1 - Pl(PM*) = 1 - F(PM*) 
The above deduction is an essence of the Kevin' s bidding 
theory which is developed from the Howard model. However there 
are two major assumptions in the model. 
Howard's assumption 
The probabili ty of winning over competi tors is not 
related to the probability of winning over each competitor 
but related to the probability of winning against the lowest 
competitor alone. 
Kevin's assumption 
The lowest competitor's bid is independent from "our" 
bid, and thus the ratio is normally distributed. It however 
implicitly assumes a stable mean of the distribution which 
has no autocorrelation. 
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Project-Specific Factors 
Howard simplified the probability of winning over the 
competitor's bids by replacing it with the probability of 
winning against the lowest bid. However, as have assumed in 
the Friedman and Gates models, there could be other variables 
which affect the probability of winning. Several factors can 
affect the probability of winning at a particular bid. 
Number of Bidders 
Intui ti vely the probabili ty of winning should decreases 
when the number of bidders increases. I f there are "n" number 
of bidders, the average probabili ty of winning among . the "n" 
bidders should be 1 over n. Hence the number of bidders could 
be a factor affecting the probabili ty of winning and therefore 
the optimum profit margin. 
Risk of Bidding 
If a bid is risky, the cost estimate which incorporates 
the risk in monetary terms, deviates wider than a non-risky 
bid. If a bid is not risky, or in other words if each bidder 
can confidently estimate the cost without uncertainty, the 
bidding results do not fluctuate so much, except the profit 
margin portion of the bid amount. It means that if the bid 
is risky or the cost estimate includes substantial 
uncertainty, the bidding results tend to vary more among the 
bidders than less risky bids. Therefore if a bid is risky, 
I 
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the distribution of bidding amount becomes flattened, and the 
difference between the lowest bid and the highest bid (or any 
other bid) becomes bigger. The risk of bidding is affected 
by various factors. 
Size of the project 
Bigger the size of project, more risky is the bid. A 
failure of one huge project may trigger a financial crisis 
of the operating firm. 
Duration of the project 
Longer the duration of project, more risky is the bid. 
For instance, long-term inflation rate is hard to estimate 
accurately if the project last for years. 
Uncertain quantity of the works 
Estimates of construction costs are broadly classified 
into two categories. One for permanent works, and the other 
for temporary works. Temporary works include the works which 
are not directly measured by the Standard Method of 
Measurement. The cost estimate of temporary works is 
difficult, and affects the deviation of bidding results. 
Other risk elements which are 
particular to one project 
Some risk elements of permanent works are born by the 
contractor. For instance, under the General Conditions of 
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Contract used by the Hong Kong Government, the risk of 
underground condition is normally born by the contractor. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
In most of bidding theories, these project-specific 
factors are neglected, or implicitly included In the 
noise/residual portion of the models. It is examined whether 
any of these project-specific factors affect the variable "x" 
significantly by applying multiple regression analysis to the 
sample data. Various factors are included in the regression 
analysis. 
Number of Bidders 
This factor should affect the variable "x" although in 
many cases it is not possible to estimate the number of bidders 
before the bid is closed. Both "n" and "l/n" will be examined 
in the regression model since the inverse of number "l/n" is, 
as explained, an average probability of winning, and thus it 
is expected to be more closely related to the variable "x" 
than the number "n" itself. 
Budget Amount 
The budget amount of Government project can be estimated 
from the maximum retention value, which is usually set as 1 
percent of the budget amount. The size and duration of proj ect 
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are usually closely correlated. In general, the bigger the 
proj ect, the longer the dura tion it needs to complete. 
Furthermore the project duration does not differ so much 
compared with the size, usually one to three years only. To 
avoid multicolinearity of size and duration effects, only the 
size factor, the budget amount, is included in the regression 
model. 
Ratio of Temporary Works to Permanent Works 
This ratio represents the uncertainty of cost estimate. 
In general, the temporary works are more difficult to estimate 
than the permanent works. The cost estimate of temporary works 
thus fluctuates more than the one of permanent works. 
Individual Estimator 
When bidding for a project, a senior estimator becomes 
responsible for coordinating the estimation process and 
finalizing the cost estimate. The bidding results of some 
estimators could be better than the others. There may be an 
estimator effect on the competitiveness of cost estimate. 
Hence individual estimators are included as dummy variables 
to separate the estimator effect. 
Government Department 
The Government departments which invite bids as dummy 
variables are included as dummy variables to investiaate 
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whether the competitiveness of cost estimate is related to 
the Government departments. 
Time-Series Analysis 
The demand and supply affect the construction market 
although such effects are not seen directly as fluctuations 
in a prevailing market price. Hence the competitiveness of 
a bidder at the time of submitting a bid fluctuates, and thus 
affects the variable "x". 
If the Government invites less tenders, the market 
becomes more competi ti ve. The bidders who consider themselves 
having insufficient proj ects start submi tting lower bids than 
usual. If several firms start submitting such lower bids, 
"our" bid becomes rela ti vely not competi ti ve. In other words, 
the difference between "our" bid and the lowest bidder'sbid 
becomes bigger than usual. It means that although "our" firm's 
pricing level is not changed, if others do change, the 
relative competitiveness of "our" firm is affected, and thus 
the variable "x" and the optimum profit margin are also 
affected. 
This phenomena is not because of the project-specific 
factors. The competitiveness of a bidder fluctuates as the 
market condition changes in long term. Hence it is time 
related. Therefore the residual portion of the regression 
analysis coulq be autocorrelated. By applying the ARIMA model 
to the residuals of regression analysis, time related effects 




be used to estimate more sensible optimum profi t margin which 
incorporates the current competitiveness of the bidder. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROFIT MARGIN ANALYSIS 
Scope of Sample Data 
Two hundred and seventy-two bids for Hong Kong 
construction projects are selected for this study. Bidding 
results for 11 years since January 1986 to December 1996 are 
included. The bidding results were published in the 
Government Gazette after the award of contract. We obtained 
the cost data of each bid from a contractor "X" which is a 
well-known contractor in Hong Kong (the company name declined 
to be acknowledged) . Because of the confidentiali ty of data, 
raw cost data are not presented in this report. 
In order to analyze the bids of similar characteristics, 
the samples are selected ' with the following criteria: 
1. They are all Government tenders and the awarded 
contractors are publicly known. 
2. Bidders belong to the category of Government List I Group 
C or List 11. 
3. Joint venture projects are not included as "our" profit 
margin is not the only factor affecting the probability 
of winning. 
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The minimum number of participants was three and the 
maximum number of participants was twenty three in the sample. 
Descriptive statistics of the samples are shown in Table 1. 
The variable "x" was calculated from the lowest competitor's 
bid price "BL" and the cost estimate "C". The data are included 
In Appendix 1. The relative frequency distribution is shown 
in Illustration 1, and the actual number of winning bids 
against profit margin is shown In Illustration 2. 
24 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SAMPLE DATA 
Project Size: 
Maximum HK$ 1,897M Maximum 24.17% 
Minimum HK$ 7. 7M Minimum -50.48% 
Mean HK$ 152.15M Mean -8.00% 
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Normal Distribution Assumption 
Howard-Kevin model assumes that the statistical 
variable (BL/C 1) is a random variable and normally 
distributed. This assumption is verified using the sample 
data by Chi-square test for goodness of fit. 
Null hypothesis (Ho): The distribution is normal. 
Alternative hypothesis: The distribution is not normal. 
Rej ection rule: If X2 > X2 a, k-m-l then rej ect Ho. 
Degree of freedom = k - m-I 
Confidence level is 5 percent a 0.05 
Since the resulting X2 is 10.77 and 2 . X a,k-m-l lS 15.51, 
we accept the null hypothesis Ho. Hence the variable (BL/C -
1) is normally distributed. Actual and theoretical values of 
frequency are shown in Illustration 3. 
ILLUSTRATION 3 
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
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Expected Profit Function 
The probabili ty density function of variable "x" and the 
probability of winning are:-
x 
Pw(x) == 1- F(x) = 1- f f(x)dx 
-00 
By incorporating the estimated mean and standard 
deviation, which are -8.00 percent and 11.89 percent 
respectively, the theoretical probability density function 
is obtained. Illustration 4 shows both theoretical and actual 
probability of winning as a function of profit margin. 
Assuming that the cost estimate "C" is constant, a 
"modified" expected profit function is given as:-
E(P) = Pw(PM) x C x PM, 
E' (P) = Pw ( PM) x PM = x {I - F ( x) } 
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Optimum Profit Margin 
The optimum profit mqrgin which maximizes the expected 
profit is given when the profit margin satisfies the following 
equation, 
_dE_'_(P_) = _d_Pr(PM) x PM = 1- F(x) - x/ex) = 0 
dPM dPM 
This differential equation can be solved by using a 
spreadsheet computer software. The optimum profit margin PM* 
is found to be 6.86 percent (Price Cost Margin of 6.42 
percent), and the probability of winning at the optimum profit 
margin 0 is 10.58 percent for the type of construction 
proj ects in our sample data. The maximum expected profi t is:-
Maximum E(P) PM*{l - F(PM*)}x C 
= 0.7250% x C 
Distribution of Cost Estimate 
As shown in the above formula, expected profit in dollar 
terms is a function of cost estimate. The distribution of cost 
estimate from the sample data was reviewed. The sample mean 
and standard deviation of cost estimate are:-
Mean: 169.11 HK$ Million 
Standard deviation: 221.79 HK$ Million 
The distribution of cost estimate is not normal. The 
histogram is shown in Illustration 6. 
ILLUSTRATION 6 
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However, it was found that the log of the cost estimate 
is normally distributed, and that the distribution of cost 
estimate is log-normal. The histogram of log of the cost 
estimate is shown in Illustration 7. The mean (~I) is 4.67, 
and the standard deviation (crI) is 0.93. If the distribution 
is log-normal, the mean and standard deviation of cost 
estimate are given as:-
~ = exp(~1 + crI2/2) = 163.81 (HK$ Million) 
cr = ~2[exp(crI2) - 1] = 191.54 (HK$ Million) 
These figures can be used by management to forecast the 
annual profit of a firm. As there were 272 bids during 11 
years, the average number of bids submitted during a year is 
27.72. Hence annual expected profit at the optimum profit 
margin is:-
E(Annual Profit) = 0.7250% x 163.81 x 27.72 
= 29.36 (HK$ Million) 
The probabili ty of winning at the optimum profi t margin 
and the expected annual turnover are:-
Pw (x) = 1 - F ( x) = 1 0 . 4 6 % 
E(Annual Turnover) = 163.81 x 27.72 x 10.46% 




















LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF COST ESTIMATE 
2.0 
Variable LNC ; distribution: Normal 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov d = .0171896, P = n.s. 
Chi-Square: 6.554749, df = 6, P = .3640170 (df adjusted) 
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 - Expected 
Category (upper limits) 
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Interpretation of the Results 
During the analysis, it was assumed that a contractor 
aims solely to maximize its expected profit of a bid. However 
actual environment is not so simple. The management need to 
maximize both the turnover as well as the expected profit of 
a bid. 
Since probability of winning decreases when profit 
margin increases, turnover decreases when profit margin 
increases. Therefore profi t margin and turnover are inversely 
related. However profit of a project increases when profit 
margin increases from 0 to the optimum profit margin (PM*), 
and it starts decreasing when profit margin is above the 
optimum one. 
Therefore profit margin greater than "PM*" yields les.s 
profit and less turnover whereas profit margin between 0 and 
"PM*" yields less profit but more turnover. From this point 
of view, the profit margin between 0 and "PM*" is a "feasible" 
range for the management. If the management put importance 
on turnover, it may decide ,to choose lower profit margin than 
the optimum profit margin in order to increase the turnover. 
There several reasons why a contractor may wish to 
maximize the turnover. 
Future Bidding Opportunity 
The Government frequently shortlist the bidders for 
bigger projects by prequalification exercise based on their 
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related experience. If turnover is higher, the chance that 
a contractor has such related experience also increases. 
Similarly clients of private sector also shortlist the 
bidders based on their experience and reputation. Therefore 
contractors need to satisfy such requirements by presenting 
"impressive" experience records. 
Higher turnover increases the opportunity of bidding 
which ultimately leads to more profit because the cumulative 
profit is a function of number of bid submitted as well as 
the profit margin and the probability of winning. 
Resource Continuity 
Contractors need to use its resources continuously. If 
the turnover .is higher, it can use its resources more 
continuously. Since contractors usually possess construction 
plant, they need to use the plant continuously in order to 
cover the depreciation cost. Further, if the number of winning 
bids per year is not enough, they can not keep their most 
competent staff in the company. Therefore, to maintain stable 
turnover is important for the contractor to maintain its 
resources. 
Fixed Cost Allocation 
Furthermore, cost estimate comprises variable and fixed 
costs. Variable cost is the one related to the project, and 
fixed cost is not related to the project itself such as an 
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overhead expenses in head/branch offices. The fixed cost 
portion is also added to the cost estimate by percentage. 
Therefore if a contractor wins a big project, such a project 
may cover a substantial portion of the fixed cost, and 
therefore the fixed cost allocated to 'the next bid can be 
reduced. The next cost estimate becomes more competitive 
because of the reduction in fixed cost portion. 
Because of relatively high monetary value of 
infrastructure projects, contractors usually win only a few 
projects per year. In my analysis, 272 bids are submitted 
during 11 years, and the probability of winning is 10.58 
percent. So the contractor would have won 2.62 projects per 
year if it had adopted the optimum profit margin of 6.82 
percent. Hence 38.22 percent of the annual fixed cost needs 
to be allocated to one winning bid. If the contractor can win 
four projects per year, the allocation should be reduced to 
25 percent of the annual fixed cost. As illustrated, the 
marginal reduction of fixed cost allocation is quite 
significant, and hence it affects the competitiveness of cost 
estimate. 
Range of Feasible Profit Margin 
Therefore adopting lower profit margin than the 
theoretical optimum one is still a rational decision of the 
management. However the management needs to determine the 




Framework of Sensitivity Analysis 
In the Howard-Kevin model, it was assumed that the 
competitiveness of cost estimate is constant. Based on such 
an assumption, an optimum profit margin which gives maximum 
expected profit was deduced from the probability density 
function of "BL/C - 1". It is because competitiveness of a firm 
usually does not change in short run". The impact of cost 
estimate on the profitability of a firm is analyzed below 
using a similar framework in previous chapters. 
If the average cost estimate is increased or decreased 
by "r" percent, the original variable "x = BL/C - 1" changes . 
to "xr " :-
Therefore the new variable "xr " will have a mean and 
standard deviation of:-
E(x r ) = {E(x) - r}/(1 + r) 
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S(Xr ) = S(x)/(l + r) 
The probability dens ,i ty function of variable "xr"is 
therefore given as:-
1 1 ? (--)[ {x-E(xr)}/S(x r)]-I(x r ) = e 2 
.j2nS(Xr) 
The optimum profit margin "PMr*" can be obtained by 
solving the equation of .-
The probabili ty of winning at the optimum profi t margin 
is therefore given as:-
Pw(PMr*) = 1 - F(PMr*) 
Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
Optimum Profit Margin and Probability of Winning 
Illustration 8 shows the effects of change in cost 
estimate on the optimum profit margin and the probability of 
winning. It is noted that both the optimum profit margin and 
the probability of winning increase when the cost estimate 
is reduced. Illustration 9 shows such effect clearly. This 
is an important finding since the profit margin and the 
probabili ty of winning do not increase simul taneously if the 
probability density distribution of cost estimate is 
unchanged. However the above analysis proved that both can 
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be increased simul taneously if the cost estimate becomes more 
competitive. In other words, if a contractor lowers the cost, 
it can increases both profit margin and turnover. 
ILLUSTRATION 8 
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN COST ESTIMATE (dC) 
ON 
THE OPTIMUM PROFIT MARGIN (PM*) 
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AND THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING A BID (Pw) 
Effect of Change in Cost Estimate (dC) on Optimal Profit Margin 
(PM*) and Probability of Winning (Pw) 
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ILLUSTRATION 9 
OPTIMUM PROFIT MARGIN (PM*) - PROBABILITY OF WINNING (Pw) 
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Expected Profit against Cost Estimate 
The expected profit is given as:-
E{P(PMr*)} = PMr*x Pw(PMr*)x(l + r)C 
Therefore, the percentage change in profit due to the 





PMr * xPw(PMr*) x (1 + r) 
PM * xPw(PM*) 
i-percentage change in profit 
The resul ts of simulation based on sample data are shown 
in Illustration 10. If the contractor "X" can reduce its 
average cost estimate by 1 percent, the expected profit -would 
increase by 16.48 percent. 
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ILLUSTRATION 10 
CHANGE IN EXPECTED PROFIT (dP) - CHANGE IN COST ESTIMATE (dC) 
Change in Expected Profit by the Change in Cost Estimate 
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Probability of Winning against Bidding Price 
Finally the original bidding price "B" also changes when 
the cost estimate changes. 
Br = C (1 + r) (1 + PM r * ) 
B = C (1 + PM*) 
Br/B = (1 + r) (1 + PMr*) I (1 + PM*) 
The change in cost estimate affects the optimum profit 
margin and thus the amount of profit of a bid. The bidding 
price "B" comprises cost and profi t. Both cost and profi tare 
therefore affected by the change in cost estimate. The 
probability of winning also changes as the optimum profit 
margin is changed. 
The change in probability of winning as a function of 
the value "Br/B" is presented in Illustration 11. This curve 
is indeed a demand curve of a contractor "X" when it optimizes 
the profit margin according to the competitiveness of its cost 
estimate. If the contractor submits "N" number of bids, the 
quantity of the awarded contract is obtained by multiplying 
"N" by the probability of winning at a particular bidding 
price level. Bidding price level of 1.0 is the current 
position of the contractor. 
This curve shows how the demand changes if the contractor 
adjusts the bidding price according to its competitiveness 








NORMALIZED DEMAND CURVE OF CONTRACTOR "X" 
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COST ESTIMATE ANALYSIS 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
In Chapter III it was analyzed how the cost estimate 
affects the optimum profit margin, expected profit and the 
bidding price of a contractor. Under the Kevin approach, "our" 
cost estimate "c" is independent from the lowest competitor's 
bid "EL'" and hence "EL/C" is normally distributed. This 
assumption is correct in so far as "EL/C" is stable, in other 
words, when "our" competitiveness of cost estimate against 
the lowest competitor's bid is stable. 
However, if the competitiveness is not stable, the mean 
of "EL/C" will change. Secondly, the variable "EL/C" could be 
affected by various proj 'ect-specific factors. Therefore, 
whether any project-specific factor affects the variable "x" 
significantly is analyzed by applying multiple regression 
model to the sample data. 
Independent Variables 
Six factors were preliminarily included in the 
regression analysis. 
49 
i) number of bidders: N 
(See Appendix 2 for sample data) 
ii) an average probability of winning: l/N 
iii) budget amount of a bid to represent the size factor: B 
(See Appendix 3 for sample data) 
iv) a ratio of temporary works to permanent works In cost 
estimate: T, (See Appendix 4 for sample data) 
v) Government's department inviting a bid as a dummy 
parameter: DGn 
vi) 
DG l Civil Engineering Services Department 
DG2 Drainage Services Department 
DG3 Highways Department 
DG 4 Hong Kong Housing Authority 
DGs Territory Development Department 
DG6 Water Supplies Department 
Other Departments 
(See Appendix 5 for sample data) 
individual estimator as a dummy parameter 
12 estimators are assigned to DEl to DE12 

























DEg SY 13 
DE IO YN 12 
DEll YYl 36 
DEl2 YY2 18 
Other Estimators 29 
(See Appendix 6 for sample data) 
Multiple Regression Model 
The multiple regression model is therefore formulated 
+ ~IOl DG 1 + 
+ ~201 DEI + 
+ ~l06 DG6 
+ ~212 DE12 
The results of regression analysis are shown ln Table 
2~ As expected, the number-of-bidders effect is more 
effectively represented by inverse of the number of bidders 
"NI", than the number "N" itself. Therefore the factor "N" 
is excluded from the model, and only the factor "NI" is used. 
The results are shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 2 
REGRESSION SUMMARY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE X 
(1 ST TRIAL) 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable X 
R= .44945502 R2= .20200982 Adjusted R2= .13150466 
F(22,249)=2.8652 p<.00004 Std.Error of estimate: .11079 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
Intercept -.203613 .102220 
-1.99192 .047472 
N .026883 .131210 .001081 .005275 
.20488 .837831 
NI .219475 .129578 .564846 .333485 
1.69377 .091560 
B .014098 .062286 .000008 .000034 
.22634 .821123 
T -.033950 .0624,82 -.069775 .128417 
-.54335 .587376 
Cl .069064 .181389 .020545 .053958 
.38075 .703712 
C2 .076622 .148003 .029460 .056904 
.51771 .605123 
C3 .017988 .165006 .006157 .056477 
.10901 .913279 
C4 -.065747 .102779 -.039603 .061910 
-.63970 . . 522958 




TABLE 2 - Cont'd 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
C6 .125018 .155432 .044304 .055082 
.80433 .421975 
El -.117092 .088688 -.035871 .027169 
-1.32027 .187959 
E2 .196300 .081512 .068737 .028542 
2.40824 .016757 
E3 -.089197 .068573 -.056244 .043239 
-1.30075 .194545 
E4 .041900 .074791 .020540 .036663 
.56023 .575827 
E5 .171326 .067811 .113657 .044986 
2.52653 .012140 
E6 .180532 .068299 .100417 .037990 
2.64327 .008732 
E7 -.011205 .067361 -.006749 .040576 
~.16634 .868027 
E8 .056777 .072790 .027101 .034745 
.78001 .436129 
E9 .131393 .067807 .073084 .037716 
1.93774 .053785 
E10 -.016351 .067834 -.009448 .039196 
-.24104 .809719 
Ell .114140 .084171 .039967 .029473 
1.35606 .176309 
E12 .118514 .070777 .056571 .033784 
1.67447 .095293 
TABLE 3 
REGRESSION SUMMARY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE X 
(2ND TRIAL) 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: X 
R= .44930534 R2= .20187529 Adjusted R2= .13483282 
F(21,250)=3.0112 p<.00002 Std.Error of estimate: .11057 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
Intercept -.186233 .056925 
-3.27155 .001220 
NI .195919 .059654 .504224 .153527 
3.28427 .001169 
B .011978 .061303 .000006 .000033 
.19539 .845250 
T -.034644 .062271 -.071203 .127982 
-.55635 .578469 
Cl .069221 .181040 .020591 .053855 
.38235 .702527 
C2 .077074 .147703 .029633 .056789 
.52182 .602258 
C3 .018119 .164688 .006202 .056369 
.11002 .912482 
C4 -.066330 .102542 -.039955 .061767 
-.64686 .518318 




TABLE 3 - Cont'd 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
C6 .125100 .155134 .044332 .054976 
.80640 .420780 
El -.117247 .088515 -.035918 .027116 
-1.32460 .186513 
E2 .196030 .081345 .068642 .028484 
2.40985 .016682 
E3 -.089765 .068386 -.056602 .043121 
-1.31263 .190511 
E4 .043396 .074291 .021273 .036418 
.58413 .559663 
E5 .172671 .067363 .114550 .044688 
2.56330 .010954 
E6 .180398 .068165 .100342 .037915 
2.64650 .008649 
E7 -.010941 .067220 -.006590 .040491 
-.16276 .870841 
E8 .057030 .072640 .027222 .034673 
.78511 .433131 
E9 .131513 .067674 .073151 .037642 
1.94332 .053100 
E10 -.015262 .067495 -.008819 .039001 
-.22612 .821295 
Ell .116108 .083460 .040656 .029224 
1.39117 .165410 
E12 .118838 .070624 .056725 .033711 
1.68270 .093682 
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From the results in Table 3, it is concluded that the 
size, temporary-works ratio, and the Government department 
do not significantly affect the dependent variable "x". 
Size effect 
As expected, the sign of beta is positive. However the 
low t-value shows that the size of project does not 
significantly affect the variable "x". It means that the 
competitiveness of "our" cost estimate is not related to the 
size of project. 
Ratio of temporary works 
to permanent works 
As expected, the sign of beta is negative. However the 
low t-value shows that the relative amount of temporary' works 
to permanent works does not affect the competitiveness of 
cost estimate. 
Government-department effect 
No significant Government-department effects exists. 
The competitiveness of cost estimate is not related to the 
Government department which invites a bid. 
Therefore these factors were excluded from the model and 
further multiple regression analysis was carried out. The 
results of regression are shown in Table 4, and the results 
of analysis of variance (ANOVA) is shown in Table 5. 
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TABLE 4 
REGRESSION SUMMARY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE X - (3RD TRIAL) 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: X 
R= .42420897 R2= .17995325 Adjusted R2= .13863306 
F(13,258)=4.3551 p<.OOOOO Std.Error of estimate: .11033 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
Intercept -.168586 .029271 
. -5.75939 .000000 
NI .177505 .058504 .456832 .150567 
3.03407 .002659 
El -.098954 .084264 -.030314 .025814 
-1.17434 .241341 
E2 .212112 .078646 .074273 .027538 
2.69706 .007456 
E3 -.071143 . 0642,11 -.044859 .040489 
-1.10795 .268915 
E4 .088417 .068773 .043343 .033713 
1.28565 .199719 
E5 .171777 .063698 .113956 .042257 
2.69675 .007463 
E6 .188062 .066231 .104605 .036839 
2.83950 .004878 
E7 -.011888 .065029 -.007161 .039171 
-.18281 .855089 
E8 .061732 .069693 .029467 .033267 
.88577 .376566 
57 
TABLE 4 - Cont'd 
St. Err. St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA B of B 
t (269) p-level 
E9 .125534 .066280 .069826 .036866 
1.89402 .059341 
ElO .007562 .065541 .004369 .037871 
.11538 .908236 
Ell .124080 .079762 .043448 .027929 
1.55562 .121023 
E12 .139555 .069379 .066614 .033117 
2.01150 .045312 
TABLE 5 
ANOVA TABLE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
(3RD TRIAL) 
Analysis of Variance; DV: X 
Sums of 
Effect Squares df 
Mean 
Squares F p-level 
Regress. .689187 13 .053014 4.355093 .000001 




The coefficients for NI, E2, ES, E6 and E12 are 
significant. Therefore, the number-of-bidders and individual 
estimators affect the dependent variable significantly. 
Number of bidders 
The number of bidders affects the variable "x". The sign 
of beta of "NI" is positive. Obviously the number of bidders 
"N" itself has an negative impact on "our" competitiveness 
of cost estimate. The less the number of bidders, the 
difference between the lowest competitor's bid and "our" cost 
estimate becomes smaller. 
Individual estimator 
The individual estimator who estimates the construction 
cost significantly affects the competitiveness of the bid. 
Four out of twelve estimators have statistically significant 
effects on the competitiveness of cost estimate. Cost 
estimate of a bid is usually assigned to an estimator who is 
most familiar with the nature of the project. The cost 
estimate is therefore done by the estimator who is most 
competent in estimating the particular proj ect. However, some 
estimators are risk averse, and others are not. Therefore the 
competitiveness of cost estimate is affected by the 
individual estimator. 
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Taking these two factors, the number-of-bidders effect 
and the estimator ' effect, the multiple regression model is 
simplified as:-
Xi = ~o : constant 
+ ~l (l/Ni): number-of bidders effect 
+ ~201 DEI + + ~212 DEl2 : estimator effect 
+ Ei : error term 
The distribution of residual is shown in 
Illustration 12. 
ILLUSTRATION 12 
DISTRIBUTION OF RAW RESIDUALS AFTER REGRESSION 
Distribution of Raw residuals 
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Analysis of Residual 
Before the multiple regression analysis, the variable 
"x" has a mean of 8.00 percent and a standard deviation of 
11.89 percent. After the multiple regression analysis, the 
residual (E) has a mean of 0 percent and a standard deviation 
of 10.77 percent. 
The variable "x" is a ratio of "our" cost estimate to 
the lowest competitor's bid, and hence it represents the 
competitiveness of "our" bid. Such competitiveness of a bid 
may fluctuate with time as the market situation changes from 
time to time. Therefore it is meaningful to check whether the 
data are autocorrelated. If they are autocorrelated, the 
current value of variable "x" is related to the past values. 
If the firm's competitiveness fluctuates in the relatively 
long term, it is possible that the variable "x" is 
autocorrelated. The result of Ourbin-Watson Statistics is 
shown below. 
Variable x o 0.07, p= 0.97 
Residual E o = 0.05, p= 0.97 
As the "0" value is so close to zero, and the" p" is close 
to one, the data is autocorrelated. Further the residual of 
regression is, as expected, more autocorrelated than the 
original variable itself. Therefore the competitiveness of 
cost estimate, the "BL/C" ratio, is autocorrelated. 
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Reasons for Autocorrelation 
Firstly, the relative level of the lowest competitor's 
bid fluctuates when the market becomes tight because of less 
tenders. Secondly, the estimators review the recent bidding 
result, and adjust the level of cost estimate. If they feel 
the market is tight, they may submit more competitive bids 
by relatively underestimating the risk of projects. 
Therefore, the lowest competitor's bid "BL" and also "c" 
fluctuate from time to time. The past bidding results 
therefore affect the competitiveness of cost estimate, and 
thus BL/C ratio. 
The BL/C ratio is therefore autocorrelated. It means that 
a part of the residual portion of regression analysis can be 
explained by the previous residuals, and thus it would be 
possible to reduce the variance of residual by identifying 
the time effects through time-series analysis. 
Time-Series Analysis (ARIMA Model) 
As a first step, the autocorrelation function and 
partial autocorrelation function of the first difference of 






































R : 0(1); 
(Standard errors are white-noise estimates) 
.. ... . ... . ... ... . . . . .... .. . ...... 
. .. . . . .. ..... 




































PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION 
OF THE FIRST DIFFERENCE OF RESIDUAL 
Partial Autocorrelation Function 
R : O(1); 
(Standard errors assume AR order of k-1) 
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The ACF plot shows a spike in lag 1 and no correlation 
for other lags. The PACF plot shows exponentially decaying 
pattern. 
ARIMA (0, 1, 1) Model 
Since there is a spike in lag 1 of ACF plot, and 
exponentially decaying pattern in PACF plot, as a rule of 
thumb, ARIMA model (p, d, q) = (0, 1, 1), with one moving 
average parameter and no autoregressi ve parameter, is adopted 
to analyze the residual data. By defining the residual E as 
a dependent variable R, the ARIMA model (0, 1, 1) is given 
as:-
"-
R(t) == R(t -1) - tk(t -1) 
This is an equivalent of simple exponential smoothing. 
The resul ts of analysis is shown in Table 6. The ACF and PACF 
plots of residual "e" of ARIMA (0, 1, 1) are shown in 
Illustrations 15 and 16. There is no more significant spike 
nor pattern in the plots. This ARIMA (0, 1, 1) model is 
statistically significant as the t-value is 59.073. 
TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF ARlMA (0, 1, 1) MODEL 
SINGLE-SERIES ARIMA RESULTS 
Variable: R 
Transformations: 0(1) 
Mode 1: ( 0 , 1 , 1 ) 
Estimation: 
Approximate Max. Likelihood Method (McLeod & Sales) 
No. Iterations: 11 
No. of Observation: 271 
Initial SS = 6 . 357 9 Final SS = 3 . 4 0 9 8 ( 53 . 63% )M S = . 0 12 68 
Parameters (p/Ps=Autoregressive/seasonal,q/Qs=Moving 
average/seasonal) 
q ( 1) 
Estimate: .95129 
Std.Err. : .01610 
t (269) : 59.073 
Lower 95%: .91958 











































R : ARIMA (0,1,1) residuals; 
(Standard errors are white-noise estimates) 
........... ...... .. ..... ... 







.0598 . . ' . . . .... ' " . . . .. ..... . .. . . . . . .. ... . 4.03 





























PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION OF ARlMA (0, 1, 1) 
Partial Autocorrelation Function 
R : ARIMA (0,1,1) residuals; 
(Standard errors assume AR order of k-1) 
Lag Corr. S.E. 
1 +.015 .0607 
2 +.002 .0607 
3 -.019 .0607 
4 -.077 .0607 
5 +.002 .0607 
6 -.090 .0607 
7 -.029 .0607 
8 -.078 .0607 
9 +.028 .0607 
10 +.030 .0607 
11 +.037 .0607 
12 -.012 .0607 
13 -.098 .0607 
14 -.015 .0607 I 
15 -.027 .0607 I 
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 
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ARIMA (1, 1, 1) Model 
The results of ARIMA model, (p, d, q) = (1, 1, 1), which 
uses one difference with one moving average, and one 
autoregressive term, are shown in Table 7. 
Improvement to the standard deviation is negligible, and 
the t-value of p(I), coefficient for autoregressive term, is 
not significant. Hence autoregressive term is not required 
in the model. 
TABLE 7 
RESULTS OF ARlMA (1, 1, 1) MODEL 
SINGLE-SERIES ARIMA RESULTS 
Variable: R 
Transformations: 0(1) 
Mode 1: ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) 
Estimation: 
Approximate Max. Likelihood Method (McLeod & Sales) 
No. Iterations: 16 
No. of Observation: 271 
Initial SS=6.3579 Final SS=3.4083 (53.61%) MS= .01272 
Parameters (p/Ps=Autoregressive/seasonal, q/Qs=Moving 
average/seasonal) 
p ( 1) q ( 1) 
Estimate: .02156 .95275 
Std.Err.: .06335 .01629 
t(268) : .34032 58.503 
Lower 95%: -.1032 .92068 
Upper 95%: .14629 .98481 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. Minimum Maximum 
R .000000 .107652 -.356691 .304486 
R: o ( 1) ; -.000076 .153453 -.490858 .385638 
R: ARIMA (0,1,1) residuals; 
-.008110 .112084 -.373248 .306084 
R: ARIMA (1,1,1) residuals; 
-.008207 .112053 -.375491 .306039 
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ARIMA (0, 2, 1) Model 
The results of ARIMA model, (p, d, q) = (0, 2, 1), which 
uses two differences with one moving average term, are shown 
in Table 8. ACF plot is shown in Illustration 17. 
As the standard deviation of ARIMA (0, 2, 1) is 
increased, and the ACF plot shows a pattern of changes of sign, 
the ARIMA (0, 2, 1) model is deemed to be over differenced. 
TABLE 8 
RESULTS OF ARlMA (0, 2, 1) MODEL 
SINGLE-SERIES ARIMA RESULTS 
Variable: R 
Transformations: 2*D(I) 
Mode 1: ( 0, 2, 1 ) 
Estimation: 
Approximate Max. Likelihood Method (McLeod & Sales) 
No. Iterations: 11 
No. of Observation: 270 
Initial SS=18.949 Final SS=7.0737 (37.33%) MS= .02639 






Lower 95%: .91569 
Upper 95%: .97325 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. 
R .000000 .107652 
R: D ( 1) ; -.000076 .153453 
R: ARIMA (0,1,1) residuals; 
-.008110 .112084 
R: 2*D(I);.000674 .265410 











AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION OF ARIMA (0, 2, 1) 
Autocorrelation Function 
R : 2*0(1); 
(Standard errors are white-noise estimates) 
Lag Corr. S.E. Q P 
1 -.667 .0605 121.3 .0000 
2 +.165 .0604 128.8 .0000 
3 +.029 .0603 129.0 .0000 
4 -.075 .0602 130.6 .0000 
5 +.103 .0601 133.5 .0000 
6 -.099 .0600 136.2 .0000 
7 +.088 .0598 138.4 .0000 
8 -.085 .0597 . . ... . . . . .... 140.4 .0000 
9 +.055 .0596 141.3 .0000 
10 -.018 .0595 141.3 .0000 
11 -.002 .0594 141.3 .0000 
12 +.052 .0593 142.1 .0000 
13 -.100 .0592 ......... .. .. ... .. 145.0 .0000 
14 +.082 . 0590 146.9 .0000 
15 -.029 .0589 147.1 .0000 
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 
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Combined Model - Multiple Regression with ARIMA Model 
As examined above, the ARIMA model of (p, d, q) = (0, 
1, 1) is most appropriate to represent the data, and hence 
the variable "x" is now modeled as:-
+ Rt + et 
where, R t = R t_ 1 - (kt_I 
The value of these coefficients are:-
~o = 0.195919, ~1 = 0.177505, ~201 = -0.98954, 
~202 0.212112, ~203 -0.71143, ~204 0.088417, 
~205 = 0.171777, ~206 0.188062, ~207 -0.011888, 
~208 = 0.061732, ~209 = 0.125534, ~210 0.007562, 
~211 = 0.124080, ~212 = 0.139555, () 0.95129 
The standard deviation of this model decreased by 5.7 




INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS 
Ratio of the Second Lowest Bid to the Lowest Bid 
Industry profitability is related to the profit margin 
which the lowest bidder adopts. The lowest-bidder's profit 
margin is determined by the past pricing level of the second 
lowest bidder. Hence the price difference between the second 
lowest and the lowest bidders affects the industry 
profitability. 
If the price difference is big enough, the lowest-
bidder's probability of winning would not be affected much 
by increasing the bidding price by 1 percent. However if the 
difference is small enough, the probability of winning would 
be greatly affected by increasing the bidding price by 1 
percent. In other words, if the price difference increases, 
the lowest-bidder's probabili ty of winning becomes less 
sensitive to the bidding price, and vice versa. 
Therefore the difference between the second lowest and 
the lowest bidders affects the bidding price of the lowest 
bidder. 
A new variable "y" is therefore defined as follows:-
Where, 
B2 - second lowest bid amount 
BL - lowest bid amount 
(See APPENDIX 7 for sample data) 
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The probability density function of variable "y" is 
found to be exponentially distributed. The graphical 
presentation of data is shown in Illustration 18. The p-value 
of Chi-Square test is 0.960, and hence the variable is 
exponentially distributed. 
The probability density function and cumulative 
probabili ty densi ty function of exponential distribution are 
given as:-
F(y) = 1 - e-vy 
v = 16.432081 
mean = l/v = 6.09 percent 
The results shows that the second lowest bid is 6.09 
percent higher than the lowest bid as average. This average 
difference affects the optimum profi t margin which an average 



















DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLE Y = B2/BL-1 
Variable "y" ; distribution: Exponential 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov d = .0117338, P = n.s. 
Chi-Square: 3.114687, df = 9, P = .9595656 (df adjusted) 
0.000 0.042 0.084 0.125 0.167 0.209 0.251 0.293 0.335 0.376 0.418 0.460 
0.021 0.063 0.105 0.146 0.188 0.230 0.272 0.314 0.355 0.397 0.439 - Expected 
Category (upper limits) 
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Optimum Profit Margin 
Suppose if the incumbents are all average contractors. 
Their cost estimate has a same mean and standard deviation, 
and their probability of winning is the same. Furthermore if 
all contractors bid without profit initially, and observed 
the mean of variable "y", what would be the optimum profit 
margin for them to adopt to maximize the profit? 
Similar to the deduction used in Howard-Kevin model, the 
variable "y" is a maximum percentage the lowest bidder can 
increase without losing the bid. Hence the optimum profit 
margin when a contractor increases the bid can be deduced as 
follows. 
Pw(y) = 1 - Pl(y) 1 - F (y) e-VY 
E(P) = Pw(PM) x C x PM, 
E' (P) = Pw(PM) x PM = y{l - F(y)} y e-vy 
dE' (P) _ d -vy _ (1 ) - vy - 0 
-----ye - -vye -
dy dy 
:. PM* = l/v 
Therefore the average contractor would adopt the profit 
margin of "l/v" to maximize its profit. As the competitiveness 
of contractors are the same, this profit margin applies to 
all contractors. Further, when all contractors adopt the 
profit margin of "l/v", the mean difference becomes:-
= [(1 + 1/v)B2]/[(1 + l/v)BL ] - 1 
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Hence the probability distribution of variable "y" is 
unchanged. This is an equilibrium state of the market as the 
contractors have no more incenti ve to change the profi t 
margin. Therefore, when all contractors are equally 
competitive, the profit margin they adopt becomes "l/v". 
Further it is interesting to note that this optimum profit 
margin is equal to the mean of variable "y" because of the 
characteristics of exponential distribution. 
This profit margin "l/v" is an average industry profit 
margin which an average contractor adopts to maximize its 
profit. The contractors who are more competitive can adopt 
higher profit margin, and vice versa. 
Although it is assumed that all contractors adopt the 
optimum profit margin, as explained in Chapter Ill, the 
optimum profit margin is the maximum one within a feasible 
range of profit margin. Contractors may bid at a profit margin 
lower than the optimum one in order to increase the turnover. 
Therefore the average profi t margin of Hong Kong construction 
industry for public-civi1 works would be less than 6.09 
percent. 
Herfindahl Index and Elasticity of Demand 
Herfindahl Index and the numbers-equivalent of firms are 
estimated from the sample data:-
H = 56. 42 x 10-4 
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l/H = 17.72 
Where, 
H - Herfindahl Index 
l/H - numbers-equivalent of firms 
Further, the price cost margin is expressed by the 
Herfindahl Index and the industry price elasticity as:-
PCM = H/ll 
Where, 
PCM - price cost margin 
11 - industry price elasticity of demand 
Therefore, the price cost margin and the price 
elasticity are given as:-
PCM = PM /(1 + PM) 
H/PCM 
= H (1 + v) 
1/(1 + v) 
= 56.42 x 10-4 x (1 + 16.43) 
= 0.9834 
The market in consideration is for public civil works, 
and thus the buyer is the Government of which the budget for 
civil works is principally fixed in its annual budget. Hence 
if the bidding price level increases by 1 percent, the number 
of projects would decrease by 1 percent. Therefore industry 
price elasticity is close to one. 
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Factors Affecting the Industry Profitability 
The ratio of the second lowest bid to the lowest bid 
critically affects the profitability of construction 
industry under competi ti ve bidding environment. Therefore it 
is useful to consider what factors affect this ratio. 
The ratio is the deviation of bid amount of the second 
lowest and the lowest bid amount. At least two factors affect 
such deviation, which are the uncertainty of cost estimate 
and the number of bidders. 
If the cost of a project is difficult to estimate, the 
bid amount would differ more significantly among the bidders. 
For example, if the contract allows fluctuation adjustment, 
which compensates the contractor for additional cost because 
of inflation, the risk of cost estimate would be less when 
compared with the one without fluctuation adjustment. If it 
is based on the fixed quantities, the risk of quantity errors 
in the Bill of Quantities provided with the tender documents 
would be born by the contractor. If the payment is based on 
remeasurement of quantiti~s, the risk is less than the ones 
based on fixed quantities. In general, if a bid is riskier, 
the deviation between the lowest and the highest bids would 
be bigger. Therefore the risk or uncertainty of cost estimate 
can be represented by the ratio of the highest bid to the 
lowest bid. 
Secondly, if the number of bidders increase, the 
deviation of bid amount of the second lowest and the lowest 
bidders would be smaller. For example, the ratio "B2/BL " with 
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five bidders would be higher than the ratio with twenty 
bidders since the bidding prices of a bid tend to distribute 
normally. 
Therefore the variable ~y" may be related to:-
i) the ratio of the highest bid amount to the lowest bid 
amount, which represent the risk of a bid, ~BH/BL"' 
(See APPENDIX 8 for sample data), and 
ii) the number of bidders ~N". 
To verify these assumptions, multiple regression 
analysis was carried out and the results are shown in Table 
9. Similar to the previous regression analysis for the profi t 
margin of a firm, independent variables ~BH/BL - 1" and "l/N", 
instead of "BH/BL" and "N", are used for regression, since they 
give the highest R2 value after regression. The betas for 
variables ~BH/BL-1" and "l/N" are both significant. This 
proves my intuitive assumption that the riskiness of bids and 
the number of bidders affect the ratio of the second lowest 
bid to the lowest bid, which critically affects the industry 
profitability. 
TABLE 9 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE "Y" 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: B2/BL - 1 
R= .47803434 R2= .22851683 Adjusted R2= .22278089 
F(2,269)=39.840 p<.OOOOO Std.Error of estimate: .05468 
St. Err. 
N=272 BETA of BETA 
t (269) p-level 
Intercept 
2.95442 .003410 
BH/BL -1 .487499 .055990 
8.70685 .000000 













Implication of Industry Profitability Analysis 
The Government can lower the profi tabili ty of the 
construction industry by lowering the entry and exi t barriers 
as well as by reducing the risk of bids. If both are 
implemented, contractors will adopt lower profit margin. 
The first approach has been implemented in Hong Kong for 
decades. The proportion of overseas contractors in Hong Kong 
is notably high. 
The second approach is not always implemented because 
of some drawbacks. If it is adopted, risk of a project would 
be born by the Government, and hence the final contract sum 
is quite difficult to estimate. For example, the Government 
adopted fixed-price contract for Airport Core Programme 
projects because these projects are under severe budgetary 
control for political reasons. Nevertheless, most of the 
Government's projects are of minimum risk. The standard 
contract is based on remeasurement and wi th fluctuation 
adjustment. 
In Japan, in contrast, most of the Government contracts 
are fixed-price ones, and the risk of projects are mainly born 
by the contractors. Furthermore, the number of bidders for 
each bid is determined by the Government, that means even 
capable contractors could be excluded from the bidder' s list. 
Entry barriers are so high that seldom overseas contractors 
are actively operating in Japan. Eventually the market is far 
from perfect competition. Therefore the profit margin is 
higher than the one in Hong Kong. 
I 
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Further it has been accused in Japan that contractors 
can collude easily because they know exactly which 
contractors are included in the list. Recently, in order to 
prevent such collusion, the Government is introducing various 
measures such as allowing more contractors, sometimes over 
fifty, to bid for a project. Although collusion should be 
eliminated, increasing the number of bidders is not enough 
to foster sound construction market. The Government should 
bear certain risks so that the contractors can survive with 
less profit margin than before. 
Finally, the industry profi tabili ty affects the abili ty 
of firms in the industry to expend in research and 
development. In Hong Kong, contractors compete so fiercely 
that no profi t remains to invest in research and development. 
In fact, advanced construction technology is seldom developed 
in Hong Kong. In Japan, in contrast, most of established 
contractors have their own research laboratory to develop new 
technologies. 
The Government strategy of keeping the industry 





By using the actual data in Hong Kong construction 
industry for public civil works, the adequacy of Howard-Kevin 
model was statistically evaluated. It was concluded that the 
variable (BL/C - 1) is normally distributed. Based on the 
normality of probability distribution, an expected profit 
function and an optimum profit margin were theoretically 
deduced. The theoretical optimum profit margin is a maximum 
feasible profit margin which management can rationally 
select. 
The sensitivity of expected profit against cost estimate 
was evaluated using the sample data. The indication was that 
1 percent reduction in th~ price would increase the revenue 
more than 1 percent, and thus the firm faces an elastic demand. 
The variable (BL/C - 1) was further analyzed by multiple 
regression model. Two factors, the number of bidders and 
individual estimator, had statistically significant effects 
on the variable. Further the residuals of regression analysis 
were autocorrelated, and were expressed by using ARIMA (0, 
1, 1) model. 
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By applying the past bidding data to the proposed models, 
useful management information were obtained, which can assist 
the management to decide the profit margin and to review the 
competitiveness of the firm. 
However this approach has several limitations. It is a 
rational decision for management not to adopt the optimum 
profit margin obtained from Howard-Kevin model. The reduction 
in allocation of fixed cost affects the competitiveness of 
cost estimate. Therefore the number of winning bids affects 
the cost estimate, and thus the optimum profit margin. This 
phenomena was not included in the model. 
Finally the profitability of construction industry 
under competitive bidding environment was analyzed, and the 
profitability was found to be closely related to the average 
difference of the bidding prices between the second lowest 
and the lowest bidders. The mean difference determines the 
profitability of average bidders in the industry. 
This study covered only the public civil works. However 
there are other categories of works such as private-civil 
works, public-building works and private-building works. It 
would be useful to carry out similar empirical studies for 
these other categories of works or even in other industries 
which involve competitive bidding. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SAMPLE DATA - VARIABLE "X" ( - BL/C - 1) 
No. x No. x No. x No. x No. x No. x No. x No. x 
1 5.1% 36 -1.3% 71 -14.7% 106 -19.8% 141 -24.8% 176 -6.8% 211 1.8% 246 -1.0% 
2 -13.5% 37 -8.2% 72 -12.8% 107 -11.5% 142 -2.1% 177 -11.8% 212 -13.3% 247 -15.5% 
3 -19.0% 38 6.2% 73 -1.0% 108 -11.7% 143 21.2% 178 -18.6% 213 -12.8% 248 -8.9% 
4 -19.8% 39 0.3% 74 -13.1 % 109 -18.7% 144 -20.2% 179 10.1 % 214 5.5% 249 -18.4% 
5 -25.9% 40 -6.7% 75 -26.2% 110 -17.2% 145 -10.8% 180 -4.7% 215 -1.7% 250 -5.0% 
6 -11.0% 41 -29.9% 76 -13.8% 111 -10.9% 146 -37.8% 181 -19.5% 216 -14.1 % 251 -2.3% 
7 -8.1% 42 -21.5% 77 -2.8% 112 -23.8% 147 -0.7% 182 -14.9% 217 -18.0% 252 -22.9% 
8 -10.0% 43 -19.3% 78 2.5% 113 -24.6% 148 5.3% 183 15.2% 218 8.5% 253 -21.3% 
9 0.4% 44 -12.8% 79 -1.1% 114 -9.4% 149 2.4% 184 -22.1% 219 -14.2% 254 -21.9% 
10 -14.5% 45 -10.4% 80 -5.3% 115 -16.0% 150 -4.8% 185 -6.6% 220 12.9% 255 -31.3% 
11 3.8% 46 5.3% 81 -21.1 % 116 -21.3% 151 -2.5% 186 -17.8% 221 -24.4% 256 -3.6% 
12 -2.3% 47 -1.4% 82 -2.6% 117 -12.9% 152 2.2% 187 -16; 1 % 222 -9.4% 257 5.4% 
13 0.5% 48 -2.0% 83 11.5% 118 7.4% 153 2.7% 188 -9.3% 223 24.2% 258 -3.3% 
14 -1.0% 49 1.5% 84 3.3% 119 -23.7% 154 -17.1% 189 8.4% 224 -15.4% 259 -2.7% 
15 -2.8% 50 -1.9% 85 -5.1% 120 -5.9% 155 -19.8% 190 -18.2% 225 2.3% 260 -27.6% 
16 -17.8% 51 -11.8% 86 -34.7% 121 1.3% 156 -14.8% 191 12.3% 226 -50.5% 261 -5.8% 
17 3.9% 52 -10.6% 87 3.1% 122 -3.9% 157 -28.1 % 192 7.4% 227 -17.7% 262 -4.8% 
18 - 3.6% 53 2.6% 88 0.2% 123 -10.1 % 158 8.6% 193 -15.3% 228 -12.7% 263 -24.7% 
19 -23.4% 54 0.9% 89 4.1% 124 -7.3% 159 -5.5% 194 -14.7% 229 3.6% 264 -4.5% 
20 0.7% 55 -24.7% 90 -8.4% 125 -6.0% 160 21.6% 195 -9.4% 230 -20.6% 265 -4.0% 
21 -7.5% 56 -11.9% 91 1.3% 126 -11.9% 161 -14.7% 196 -14.1 % 231 -5.9% 266 -11.9% 
22 -12.5% 57 -0.7% 92 -14.0% 127 -11.6% 162 1.4% 197 -10.5% 232 5.4% 267 -12.3% 
23 -27.1% 58 -4.6% 93 -17.7% 128 -11.0% 163 -15.7% 198 -28.8% 233 -18.7% 268 -5.5% 
24 -15.1 % 59 -19.9% 94 -10.6% 129 -5.5% 164 -19.4% 199 -7.2% 234 -11.5% 269 11.7% 
25 0.3% 60 -35.0% 95 10.8% 130 -0.1% 165 -6.6% 200 -10.5% 235 -5.8% 270 -5.5% 
26 9.5% 61 -2.4% 96 -16.8% 131 -3.9% 166 1.7% 201 -6.1% 236 -28.9% 271 5.9% 
27 4.5% 62 -0.8% 97 -39.3% 132 -2.2% 167 0.1% 202 -0.3% 237 -0.2% 272 3.9% 
28 4.6% 63 -8.2% 98 -11.5% 133 6.8% 168 -14.3% 203 -10.2% 238 -24.4% 
29 8.7% 64 17.7% 99 -1.0% 134 -17.8% 169 1.7% 204 -10.9% 239 -23.6% 
30 1.8% 65 11.0% 100 13.7% 135 9.1% 170 -8.7% 205 4.4% 240 -20.5% 
31 -25.3% 66 -15.1 % 101 -1.1% 136 -21.1 % 171 -1.5% 206 -5.2% 241 11.5% 
32 3.0% 67 4.1% 102 -14.4% 137 -21 .3% 172 -25.7% 207 -9.9% 242 -8.9% 
33 -6.6% 68 23.5% 103 -3.8% 138 5.9% 173 3.0% 208 -19.7% 243 -10.5% 
34 3.0% 69 -26.9% 104 -3.1% 139 -34.7% 174 -13.4% 209 -8.5% 244 -13.9% 
35 -8.6% 70 3.1% 105 8.2% 140 -1.2% 175 -10.0% 210 -32.3% 245 -5.2% 
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APPENDIX 2 
SAMPLE DATA - NUMBER OF BIDDERS "N" 
No. N No. N No. N No. N No. N No. N No. N No. N 
1 11 36 7 71 9 106 12 141 9 176 8 211 12 246 6 
2 8 37 4 72 7 107 8 142 9 177 10 212 9 247 13 
3 10 38 7 73 5 108 11 143 6 178 12 213 8 248 18 
4 9 39 9 74 6 109 14 144 7 179 8 214 7 249 14 
5 7 40 10 75 6 110 10 145 16 180 7 215 7 250 17 
6 7 41 13 76 5 111 13 146 10 181 7 216 10 251 9 
7 12 42 10 77 8 112 11 147 10 182 10 217 7 252 7 
8 9 43 6 78 5 113 7 148 10 183 8 218 8 253 14 
9 6 44 8 79 6 114 8 149 8 184 7 219 6 254 14 
10 6 45 9 80 4 115 13 150 11 185 8 220 6 255 11 
11 10 46 6 81 10 116 13 151 10 186 8 221 8 256 9 
12 8 47 5 82 6 117 9 152 12 187 10 222 6 257 11 
, 13 9 48 7 83 10 118 12 153 7 188 7 223 ' 4 258 _ 7 
-
14 9 49 9 84 5 119 11 154 9 189 8 224 8 259 11 
15 8 50 5 85 8 120 5 155 10 190 8 225 ' 5 260 11 
16 9 51 9 86 11 121 16 156 4 191 12 226 9 261 7 
. -
17 9 52 6 87 8 122 12 157 10 192 5 227 12 262 9 
18 8 53 6 88 5 123 10 158 6 193 8 228 19 263 10 
, 19 5 54 12 89 9 124 13 159 10 194 9 229 6 264 7 
20 9 55 10 90 11 125 10 160 8 195 9 230 13 265 8 
" 
21 9 56 8 91 8 126 10 161 6 196 11 231 20 266 12 
22 8 57 10 92 6 127 8 162 6 197 11 232 7 267 10 
23 5 58 6 93 13 128 11 163 4 198 6 233 14 268 10 
24 3 59 8 94 10 129 13 164 8 199 6 234 14 269 10 
25 9 60 6 95 5 130 20 165 7 200 8 235 8 270 10 
26 14 61 8 96 11 131 9 166 8 201 8 236 10 271 10 
27 4 62 6 97 9 132 10 167 11 202 6 237 14 272 7 
28 7 63 5 98 9 133 7 168 5 203 10 238 9 
29 11 64 5 99 9 134 14 169 5 204 6 239 11 
30 3 65 5 100 6 135 8 170 9 205 5 240 13 
31 8 66 7 101 16 136 8 171 6 206 9 241 5 
32 8 67 7 102 13 137 5 172 9 207 4 242 10 
33 7 68 4 103 8 138 9 173 7 208 7 243 10 
34 5 69 7 104 7 139 6 174 10 209 5 244 6 
35 8 70 5 105 7 140 12 175 5 210 5 245 13 
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APPENDIX 3 
SAMPLE DATA - BUDGET AMOUNT "B" (HK$ MILLION) 
No. B No. B No. B No. B No. B No. B No. B No. B 
1 137 36 90 71 34 106 50 141 155 176 42 211 329 246 61 
2 146 37 19 72 140 107 61 142 137 177 45 212 500 247 91 
3 178 38 79 73 201 108 35 143 80 178 155 213 87 248 65 
4 52 39 43 74 22 109 100 144 320 179 1,500 214 31 249 98 
5 16 40 17 75 35 110 79 145 67 180 420 215 300 250 385 
6 25 41 49 76 140 111 32 146 69 181 55 216 91 251 98 
7 65 42 16 77 37 112 150 147 400 182 90 217 275 252 250 
8 129 43 44 78 90 113 1,000 148 250 183 203 218 180 253 150 
9 17 44 36 79 87 114 1,700 149 120 184 146 219 161 254 83 
10 84 45 60 80 49 115 79 150 594 185 90 220 400 255 183 
11 40 46 126 81 60 116 160 151 300 186 300 221 228 256 155 
12 135 47 81 82 400 117 30 152 63 187 550 222 400 257 73 
13 23 48 200 83 66 118 34 153 48 188 29 223 250 258 451 
, 14 59 49 120 84 85 119 53 154 220 189 240 224 157 259 194 
15 22 50 115 85 205 120 45 155 87 190 580 225 260 260 101 
16 115 51 125 86 102 121 100 156 10 191 60 226 55 261 150 
17 24 52 100 87 95 122 59 157 50 192 60 227 78 262 70 
. 18 40 53 173 88 374 123 32 158 69 193 125 228 76 263 69 
19 · 56 54 48 89 356 124 340 159 321 194 450 229 37 264 149 
20 150 55 ·24 90 50 125 127 160 51 195 127 230 147 265 215 
21 97 56 153 91 180 126 205 161 40 196 31 231 147 266 145 
22 215 57 97 92 360 127 204 162 45 197 74 232 400 267 340 
23 69 58 250 93 54 128 73 163 55 198 60 233 329 268 145 
24 190 59 20 94 63 129 348 164 82 199 186 234 250 269 10 
25 215 60 31 95 20 130 48 165 161 200 883 235 525 270 187 
26 30 61 94 96 35 131 80 166 70 201 100 236 1,011 271 68 
27 110 62 300 97 291 132 85 167 334 202 96 237 336 272 1,600 
28 270 63 80 98 300 133 130 168 33 203 591 238 276 
29 63 64 18 99 81 134 200 169 100 204 94 239 86 
30 18 65 19 100 300 135 115 170 57 205 20 240 51 
31 38 66 28 101 70 136 250 171 99 206 60 241 185 
32 60 67 75 102 36 137 41 172 80 207 108 242 414 
33 75 68 75 103 153 138 135 173 600 208 600 243 127 
34 207 69 30 104 48 139 910 174 72 209 40 244 192 
35 245 70 220 105 295 140 175 175 40 210 350 245 70 
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APPENDIX 4 
SAMPLE DATA - COST ESTIMATE 
RATIO OF TEMPORARY WORKS TO PERMANENT WORKS "T" 
No. T No. T No. T No. T No. T No. T No. T No. T 
1 10.3% 36 14.1% 71 19.8% 106 14.9% 141 11 .3% 176 18.2% 211 12.7% 246 15.1 % 
2 11.6% 37 6.4% 72 13.1 % 107 3.0% 142 10.7% 177 12.3% 212 15.6% 247 2.8% 
3 13.2% 38 12.7% 73 16.1 % 108 15.5% 143 16.2% 178 12.0% 213 17.0% 248 21.5% 
4 11.2% 39 15.4% 74 5.4% 109 12.7% 144 8.1% 179 17.5% 214 12.0% 249 2.4% 
5 2.9% 40 9.0% 75 23.2% 110 21.4% 145 4.6% 180 8.2% 215 22.7% 250 19.4% 
6 13.4% 41 8.8% 76 24.6% 111 13.0% 146 13.3% 181 15.9% 216 12.0% 251 17.9% 
7 7.0% 42 11.9% 77 14.8% 112 11.8% 147 9.2% 182 13.5% 217 14.4% 252 11.2% 
8 6.8% 43 7.7% 78 9.3% 113 4.8% 148 7.1% 183 11.3% 218 21.7% 253 9.3% 
9 4.6% 44 9.8% 79 17.6% 114 8.1% 149 4.8% 184 14.1 % 219 11.9% 254 29.6% 
10 11.9% 45 20.0% 80 13.6% 115 13.9% 150 6.1 % 185 11.5% 220 14.5% 255 7.4% 
11 12.0% 46 19.8% 81 29.1% 116 8.7% 151 6.4% 186 8.4% 221 9.0% 256 8.7% 
12 9;1% 47 17.4% 82 16.9% 117 21.4% 152 2.5% 187 19.9% 222 14.1 % 257 32.3% . 
13 17.4% 48 13.2% 8-3 15.2% 118 13.6% 153 9.2% 188 24.2% 223 14.9% 258 14.7% 
14 8.7% 49 16.8% 84 14.1% 119 20.4% 154 6.3% 189 17.4% 224 21.0% 259 5.1% 
l5 9:5% 50 17.9% 8-5 5.5% 120 1.9% 155 8.0% 190 8.6% 225 12.7% 260 11.4% 
16 9.3% 51 14.2% 86 18.9% 121 3.0% 156 12.4% 191 6.2% 226 11.2% 261 11 .0% 
-17 8.9% 52 18.5% 87 11.1 % 122 4.8% 157 5.4% 192 15.9% 227 15.4% 262 6.0% 
18 12.2% 53 19.5% 88 13.2% 123 1.0% 158 10.6% 193 10.2% 228 15.1 % 263 136% 
. 19 9.2% 54 13.9% 89 10.0% 124 8.5% 159 4.8% 194 12.4% 229 19:2% 264 11.4% 
. 20 16.1% 5-5 9.1% 90 12.5% 125 5.5% 160 9.6% 195 12.5% 230 29.4% 265 9.9% 
-
21 28.5% 56 19.7% 91 7.6% 126 9.5% 161 4.2% 196 8.8% 231 7.1% 266 12.3% 
22 16.5% 57 17.8% 92 16.4% 127 7.2% 162 14.0% 197 13.6% 232 19.1 % 267 12.5% 
23 10.0% 58 18.2% 93 15.7% 128 11.4% 163 17.9% 198 15.0% 233 9.3% 268 12.3% 
24 18.6% 59 18.4% 94 12.4% 129 8.3% 164 12.0% 199 25.3% 234 10.4% 269 17.5% 
25 15.0% 60 11.4% 95 17.7% 130 8.0% 165 5.9% 200 9.8% 235 7.9% 270 6.6% 
26 6.6% 61 10.9% 96 15.4% 131 14.7% 166 6.3% 201 19.3% 236 5.0% 271 14.8% 
27 7.2% 62 13.7% 97 2.0% 132 2.8% 167 7.7% 202 22.4% 237 7.9% 272 5.9% 
28 17.0% 63 6.7% 98 12.9% 133 12.9% 168 11.3% 203 9.2% 238 11 .8% 
29 11.6% 64 3.6% 99 10.7% 134 14.3% 169 5.6% 204 14.1 % 239 18.4% 
30 5.7% 65 7.5% 100 2.0% 135 7.0% 170 9.0% 205 29.2% 240 10.7% 
31 8.5% 66 2.8% 101 17.6% 136 12.0% 171 7.5% 206 14.4% 241 11 .3% 
32 9.2% 67 3.8% 102 7.0% 137 2.8% 172 15.8% 207 18.2% 242 8.6% 
33 9.9% 68 13.6% 103 12.6% 138 5.5% 173 22.7% 208 21.1 % 243 18.1 % 
34 14.5% 69 25.2% 104 18.9% 139 10.3% 174 19.2% 209 16.8% 244 19.4% 
35 9.9% 70 18.6% 105 14.8% 140 2.6% 175 21.8% 210 16.5% 245 18.0% 
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APPENDIX 5 
SAMPLE DATA - GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT "DG" 
No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. No. DG No. 
1 5 36 5 71 6 106 5 141 5 176 5 211 5 246 6 
2 4 37 5 72 1 107 6 142 5 177 6 212 3 247 6 
3 5 38 5 73 5 108 5 143 6 178 5 213 6 248 5 
4 5 39 5 74 5 109 1 144 6 179 3 214 5 249 1 
5 7 40 6 75 1 110 2 145 1 180 2 215 3 250 2 
6 7 41 3 76 5 111 5 146 2 181 5 216 5 251 2 
7 3 42 1 77 4 112 5 147 1 182 3 217 3 252 2 
8 5 43 1 78 5 113 1 148 6 183 5 218 1 253 1 
9 5 44 6 79 5 114 5 149 5 184 5 219 1 254 . 5 
10 4 45 5 80 5 115 1 150 6 185 6 220 3 255 · 5 
11 , 5 46 6 81 3 116 1 151 5 186 5 221 ·5 256 . 1 
12 -. 5 47 5 · 82 1 117 5 152 2 187 3 222 2 257 1 
.. ·.13 5 ·48 . 4 ·83 5 118 5 153 3 188 2 223 2 258 5 
: .. 14 . 5 49 . 5 ·84 5 119 3 154 1 189 · 3 224 · 4 259 5 
15 . 5 50 5 ' 85 1 120 7 155 ·1 190 6 225 2 260 5 
16 5 51 1 86 4 121 7 156 4 191 1 226 2 261 2 
· . 17 5 52 3 87 5 122 6 157 5 192 2 227 6 262 6 
18 . 5 53 1 88 5 123 1 158 2 193 1 228 ' 6 263 5 
19 4 54 . ·1 ·89 3 124 1 159 5 194 2 229 2 264 5 
20 . - ·5 55 4 90 1 125 1 160 : 5 195 -5 230 . 2 265 3 
: ; 21 5 56 3 91 1 126 5 161 7 196 1 231 5 266 5 
22 5 57 5 92 5 127 5 162 2 197 6 232 5 267 5 
23 1 58 5 93 3 128 5 163 3 198 1 233 1 268 3 
24 3 59 1 94 5 129 3 164 1 199 6 234 2 269 1 
25 5 60 5 95 1 130 5 165 6 200 6 235 1 270 6 
26 6 61 3 96 3 131 5 166 4 201 6 236 1 271 5 
27 1 62 5 97 1 132 3 167 3 202 5 237 5 272 6 
28 4 63 1 98 1 133 2 168 2 203 5 238 2 
29 1 64 1 99 1 134 1 169 6 204 3 239 5 
30 5 65 1 100 1 135 5 170 6 205 3 240 6 
31 3 66 5 101 1 136 2 171 6 206 3 241 1 
32 5 67 5 102 6 137 6 172 3 207 5 242 5 
33 5 68 5 103 3 138 1 173 3 208 3 243 2 
34 5 69 1 104 2 139 3 174 2 209 3 244 2 
35 5 70 6 105 3 140 6 175 3 210 5 245 2 
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APPENDIX 6 
SAMPLE DATA - ESTIMATOR "DE" 
No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. No. DE No. 
1 9 36 3 71 13 106 1 141 1 176 6 211 11 246 11 
2 9 37 13 72 1 107 6 142 6 177 1 212 7 247 1 
3 9 38 2 73 8 108 1 143 13 178 1 213 10 248 11 
4 3 39 11 74 13 109 8 144 4 179 5 214 2 249 11 
5 11 40 12 75 2 110 13 145 7 180 1 215 13 250 1 
6 13 41 11 76 4 111 1 146 1 181 1 216 10 251 11 
7 13 42 11 77 2 112 1 147 11 182 1 217 1 252 4 
8 12 43 1 78 2 113 3 148 4 183 1 218 11 253 11 
9 13 44 12 79 4 114 3 149 2 184 1 219 11 254 2 
10 13 45 13 80 4 115 8 150 4 185 8 220 13 255 8 
11 9 46 9 81 13 116 1 151 7 186 1 221 1 256 2 
, 12 9 47 12 82 3 117 2 152 4 187 7 222 1 257 11 
13 12 48 9 83 2 118 2 153 6 188 1 223 6 258 11 
' 14 3 49 12 84 2 119 1 154 : 11 189 8 224 11 259 8 
.•.. 
'15 7 50 9 85 2 120 1 155 1 190 . .: 13 225 1 260 1 
16 10 51 12 86 13 121 4 156 13 191 . 2 226 1 261 8 
17 13 52 12 87 5 122 4 157 2 192 6 227 10 262 4 
18 12 53 13 88 13 123 3 158 6 193 6 228 · 10 263 13 
19 10 54 1 89 5 124 1 159 1 194 ' ,.' 7 229 2 264 11 
20 12 55 1 90 8 125 8 160 2 195 <10 230 2 265 2 
21 12 56 12 91 6 126 2 161 13 196 2 231 11 266 11 
22 12 57 1 92 5 127 8 162 6 197 .. 7 232 2 267 2 
23 9 58 13 93 8 128 5 163 1 198 7 233 11 268 11 
24 12 59 11 94 13 129 5 164 11 199 6 234 2 269 11 
25 9 60 3 95 11 130 5 165 10 200 1 235 11 270 4 
26 12 61 2 96 8 131 1 166 6 201 13 236 11 271 11 
27 9 62 12 97 3 132 2 167 1 202 11 237 11 272 4 
28 9 63 1 98 3 133 1 168 1 203 11 238 1 
29 8 64 11 99 8 134 13 169 10 204 2 239 13 
30 2 65 8 100 2 135 2 170 10 205 2 240 4 
31 2 66 13 101 6 136 1 171 2 206 7 241 10 
32 2 67 12 102 13 137 4 172 1 207 10 242 11 
33 2 68 12 103 8 138 1 173 5 208 7 243 11 
34 9 69 13 104 1 139 8 174 1 209 7 244 1 
35 2 70 4 105 5 140 4 175 1 210 1 245 11 
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APPENDIX 7 
SAMPLE DATA - COST ESTIMATE 
RATIO OF THE SECOND LOWEST BID TO THE LOWEST BID "B2/BL" 
No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL No. B2/BL 
1 1.05 36 1.01 71 1.01 106 1.01 141 1.03 176 1.05 211 1.01 246 1.04 
2 1.03 37 1.02 72 1.01 107 1.12 142 1.00 177 1.01 212 1.13 247 1.20 
3 1.03 38 1.03 73 1.02 108 1.01 143 1.18 178 1.06 213 1.00 248 1.03 
4 1.07 39 1.01 74 1.01 109 1.00 144 1.21 179 1.07 214 1.06 249 1.11 
5 1.13 40 1.06 75 1.03 110 1.10 145 1.15 180 1.08 215 1.01 250 1.01 
6 1.03 41 1.03 76 1.03 111 1.01 146 1.01 181 1.19 216 1.04 251 1.05 
7 1.07 42 1.10 77 1.03 112 1.03 147 1.03 182 1.03 217 1.12 252 1.12 
8 1.11 43 1.16 78 1.01 113 1.08 148 1.03 183 1.12 218 1.08 253 1.15 
9 1.00 44 1.06 79 1.03 114 1.13 149 1.03 184 1.20 219 1.06 254 1.03 
10 1.04 45 1.11 80 1.05 115 1.18 150 1.01 185 1.02 220 1.13 255 1.06 
11 1.04 46 1.02 81 1.02 116 1.03 151 1.04 186 ' 1.09 221 1.11 256 1.05 
12 1.02 47 1.02 82 1.05 117 1.03 152 1.01 187 1.02 222 1.00 257 1.02 
13 1.01 48 1.02 : 83 1.09 118 1.05 153 1.01 188 1.07 223 1.24 258 1.04 
14 1.00 49 1.01 84 1.02 119 1.01 154 1.08 189 1.06 224 1.18 259 1.03 
15 1.00 50 1.00 85 1.09 120 1.05 155 1.07 190 ' 1.24 225 1.01 260 1.02 
16 1.01 51 1.07 86 1.07 121 1.01 156 1.23 191 1.09 226 1.20 261 1.03 
17 1.04 52 1.03 87 1.00 122 1.07 157 1.09 192 1.04 227 1.01 262 1.07 
18 1.04 53 1.00 88 1.00 123 1.00 158 1.05 193 1.07 228 1.02 263 ' 1.07 ~ . 
19 1..08 54 1.02 89 1.01 124 1.00 159 1.09 194 1.05 229 1.02 264 ' 1.05 
20 1.01 55 1.24 90 1.08 125 1.02 160 ' 1.18 195 ' 1.01 230 1.15 265 1.06 
21 1.01 56 1.07 91 1.02 126 1.12 161 1.19 196 . 1.19 231 1.00 266 ' 1.07 
22 1.00 57 1.01 92 1.03 127 1.17 162 1.01 197 1.00 232 1.05 267 1.07 
23 1.12 58 1.04 93 1.12 128 1.10 163 1.02 198 1.02 233 1.08 268 1.03 
24 1.04 59 1.05 94 1.02 129 1.01 164 1.11 199 1.09 234 1.01 269 1.08 
25 1.00 60 1.34 95 1.07 130 1.03 165 1.07 200 1.07 235 1.02 270 1.04 
26 1.09 61 1.06 96 1.11 131 1.01 166 1.01 201 1.06 236 1.13 271 1.03 
27 1.05 62 1.04 97 1.14 132 1.01 167 1.00 202 1.00 237 1.01 272 1.03 
28 1.01 63 1.01 98 1.03 133 1.02 168 1.20 203 1.03 238 1.26 
29 1.06 64 1.14 99 1.04 134 1.01 169 1.01 204 1.12 239 1.14 
30 1.01 65 1.08 100 1.10 135 1.06 170 1.04 205 1.00 240 1.06 
31 1.12 66 1.00 101 1.06 136 1.05 171 1.05 206 1.05 241 1.10 
32 1.01 67 1.01 102 1.06 137 1.13 172 1.11 207 1.14 242 1.01 
33 1.06 68 1.20 103 1.01 138 1.03 173 1.02 208 1.09 243 1.07 
34 1.03 69 1.01 104 1.00 139 1.07 174 1.13 209 1.02 244 1.10 
35 1.01 70 1.10 105 1.05 140 1.00 175 1.01 210 1.40 245 1.05 
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APPENDIX 8 
SAMPLE DATA - COST ESTIMATE 
RATIO OF THE HIGHEST BID TO THE LOWEST BID "BH/BL" 
No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL No. BH/BL 
1 1.81 36 1.18 71 1.33 106 1.49 141 1.37 176 1.53 211 1.18 246 1.51 
2 1.38 37 1.12 72 1.23 107 1.34 142 1.26 177 1.53 212 1.38 247 2.29 
3 1.23 38 1.19 73 1.08 108 2.04 143 1.69 178 1.36 213 1.39 248 1.53 
4 1.43 39 1.25 74 1.27 109 1.38 144 1.56 179 1.60 214 1.19 249 1.58 
5 1.64 40 1.36 75 1.40 110 1.79 145 1.92 180 1.51 215 1.44 250 1.58 
6 1.31 41 1.95 76 1.20 111 1.24 146 1.68 181 1.43 216 1.39 251 1.37 
7 1.45 42 1.42 77 1.46 112 1.45 147 1.20 182 1.35 217 1.64 252 1.74 
8 1.41 43 1.38 78 1.12 113 1.40 148 1.44 183 2.06 218 1.88 253 1.99 
9 1.37 44 1.22 79 1.14 114 1.36 149 1.29 184 1.73 219 1.23 254 1.52 
10 1.28 45 1.53 80 1.09 115 1.94 150 1.44 185 1.24 220 1.44 255 1.50 
11 ', 1.45 46 1.28 81 1.55 116 1.33 151 1.34 186 1.40 221 1.51 256 1.39 
12 - ·., 1.35 47 1.43 82 1.46 117 1.48 152 ' 1 :56 187 1.99 222 -1.41 257 1.34 
.. ; ',13 
_·1.28 48 1.49 83 2.17 118 1.28 153 1.29 188 1.22 223 1.42 258 1.54 
'14 . ,~ 1..08 49 1.26 84 1.36 119 1.63 154 1.36 189 - 1.50 224 1.66 259 1.13 
15 :: 1.33 50 1.10 85 1.71 120 1.19 -155 1.33 190 :1.44 225 1.82 260 1.47 
16 :, 1.47 51 1.58 86 1.88 121 1.34 156 1.53 191 1.47 226 2.08 261 1.16 
17 1.54 52 1.41 87 1.40 122 1.37 157 1.70 192 -1.20 227 1.57 262 1.29 
- - 18 :. 1.25 53 1.28 88 1.42 123 1.99 158 1.25 193 2.13 228 1.47 263 1.37 
-, ~ t9 1.30 54 1.38 89 1.36 124 1.24 159 1.66 194 ' 1.30 229 1.42 264 1.38 
-, "' 20 ' 1.38 55 .1.58 90 1.76 125 1.31 160 : 1~65 195 . 1.15 230 1.91 265 1.43 
21 - 1.3~ 56 1.23 - 91 1.63 126 1.38 161 l.34 196 . _ 1.48 231 1.47 266 1.38 
22 -'1.39 57 1.27 9-2 1.20 127 1.47 162 1.39 197 1.45 232 1.70 267 1.50 
23 1.54 58 1.25 93 1.44 128 1.28 163 1.22 198 1.55 233 1.54 268 1.53 
24 1.05 59 1.33 94 1.32 129 1.21 164 1.55 199 1.25 234 1.53 269 2.04 
25 1.30 60 1.59 95 1.71 130 1.37 165 1.71 200 1.32 235 1.14 270 1.31 
26 1.44 61 1.41 96 1.77 131 1.26 166 1.15 201 1.21 236 1.71 271 1.27 
27 1.19 62 1.25 97 1.76 132 1.10 167 1.29 202 1.10 237 1.35 272 1.79 
28 1.39 63 1.14 98 1.59 133 1.09 168 1.58 203 1.72 238 1.67 
29 1.36 64 2.08 99 1.39 134 1.40 169 1.07 204 1.51 239 1.47 
30 1.01 65 1.62 100 1.51 135 1.25 170 1.33 205 1.28 240 1.58 
31 1.39 66 1.51 101 1.60 136 1.34 171 1.29 206 1.43 241 1.49 
32 1.30 67 1.30 102 1.48 137 1.32 172 1.39 207 1.16 242 1.44 
33 1.19 68 1.40 103 1.27 138 1.70 173 1.48 208 1.69 243 1.34 
34 1.11 69 1.41 104 1.24 139 1.67 174 1.53 209 1.21 244 1.38 
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